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Direct Democracy and Legislative
Dysfunction: California Politics
Since 1978
La démocratie directe et les dysfonctionnements de la législature : la vie
politique californienne depuis 1978
Robert W. Cherny
1 Over  the  past  several  decades,  critics  from  across  the  political  spectrum  have
condemned California’s legislature as seriously dysfunctional – unable to pass budgets
on time and unable to resolve chronic and increasing deficits. The culprit, according to
one argument, is direct democracy – the initiative, referendum, and recall, especially
the  initiative.  This  essay  examines  that  argument  by  looking  at  the  use  of  these
political procedures since the 1970s and the ways that direct democratic procedures
have contributed to legislative dysfunction, then evaluates the likelihood that recent
changes in election procedures (approved through direct democracy) will resolve the
dysfunction, and concludes with proposals to restore the ability of the legislature to
legislate.
2 In examining the nexus between direct democracy and governmental dysfunction over
the past third of a century, this paper will also outline a long-term process whereby
political  conservatives,  predominantly  advocates  of  small  government  and  the  free
market, along with such special interest groups as business associations and so-called
taxpayer organizations, nearly all of them closely aligned with the Republican party,
have restructured governance, often using the instruments of direct democracy. One
element in this restructuring has been these groups’ consistent efforts to limit state
revenues and, hence, state services – as conservatives have repeatedly said, “to starve
the  beast”  of  government.  Small  government  conservatives  have  also  used  the
initiative to limit government in other ways – to hobble the beast, as it were. Other
interest groups, notably teachers’ unions and environmental groups, have responded
by using the initiative to create or protect state-funded programs. The consequence of
this “government by initiative” has been to place serious constraints on the ability of
Direct Democracy and Legislative Dysfunction: California Politics Since 1978
Siècles, 37 | 2013
1
the  legislature  to  govern  and  to  shift  power  from  elected  legislators  to  organized
interest groups and the governor.  In addition,  Republicans have repeatedly used or
threatened to use the recall to discipline their own ranks and to intimidate or punish
their opponents.  Recent governors from both parties have come to govern through
initiatives, sometimes with partisan motives and other times to bypass the gridlocked
legislature. This restructuring of governance has not yet run its full course.1
3 This political struggle reflects competing visions for California: one based on a belief in
small  government  and  free  markets,  with  strict  constraints  on  the  ability  of  the
legislature to tax and spend, and the other derived from the progressives of the early
20th century and liberals of the 1950s and 1960s who used the state to regulate powerful
corporations, build public infrastructure, and create an educational system open to all
at minimal cost. At base, these competing visions ask whether the common good is best
accomplished by restricting state power and freeing individuals to maximize their own
personal well being, or whether the common good requires an active state to restrict
private power so that all individuals can reach their maximum potential. Both groups
have used direct democracy to advance their vision, but California voters have been
inconsistent in adopting one or the other of these visions. The Democrats, who embrace
the notion of active government, have long had a majority both among voters and in
the legislature. However, small-government conservatives have often been successful
in promoting popular initiatives that have constrained legislative action.2 Thus, as a
consequence in significant part of direct democracy, the legislative majority often finds
itself  unable  to  legislate.  To  those  who  favor  active  government,  this  appears  as
dysfunction; to the advocates of minimal government, these results may well be exactly
what they intended. 
 
“Government by Initiative” and Legislative Gridlock
4 Figure 1 summarizes California’s experience with statewide initiatives and referenda.
Between 1912 and 1939, there was considerable interest in using these tools, leading to
134 initiatives or referenda, averaging nearly five per year. Then the numbers dropped,
reaching a low point in the 1960s, with only nine statewide propositions. 
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Figure 1: California Initiative and Referendum Propositions, by Decades, 1912-2012
Sources: John M. Allswang, California Initiatives and Referendums, 1912-1990 (Los Angeles: Edmund G.
“Pat” Brown Institute of Public Affairs, 1991); California Secretary of State, A History of California
Initiatives http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/init_history.pdf, 10, accessed 21 March 2012; California
Secretary of State, http://www.sos.ca.gov/htm, accessed 18 July 2012; “List of California Ballot
Propositions,” Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_California_ballot_propositions, accessed
18 July 2012.
5 Figure 1  suggests  a  turning point  in  the 1970s,  after  which there was  a  significant
increase in the use of the instruments of direct democracy, especially the initiative. In
November  1988,  for  an  extreme example,  voters  faced  a  mind-numbing total  of  29
propositions,  of  which 12  were voter  initiatives.  Two years  later,  they voted on 28
propositions, including 13 voter initiatives.3
6 What happened in the 1970s to produce the upsurge in the use of direct democracy?
Some of  it  reflected grassroots  activism on social  and cultural  issues,  but  the most
important  initiative  of  that  decade was  certainly  Proposition 13  of  1978.  Run-away
inflation spurred this initiative. The annual rate of inflation reached double digits in
1974-1975, fell to 5-7% in 1976-1977, then climbed to 9% in late 1978. Californians found
themselves  paying  more  for  necessities  and  also  paying  higher  taxes.  Although
individual  income  generally  failed  to  keep  pace  with  inflation,  incomes  increased
enough to push many Californians into higher state income tax brackets.  Inflation-
driven increases in property values produced higher assessments and hence higher
property taxes. By 1978, inflated taxes, together with a tight-fisted approach to state
expenditures by Governor Jerry Brown, generated a state budget surplus of nearly $4
billion, a larger surplus than in all  the other states combined.4 This combination of
rising taxes and a huge state surplus spawned a very angry electorate.
7 During  1977,  Howard  Jarvis  and  Paul  Gann  created  the  United  Organization  of
Taxpayers  and launched a  tax  initiative,  which became Proposition 13  on the 1978
primary ballot. It passed by a large majority. The new law set residential and business
property taxes at one percent of assessed value, rolled back assessed values to 1975
levels, and limited annual increases in assessed value to two percent. Reassessments
were possible only when property was bought or improved. New taxes required two-
thirds approval in the legislature rather than the previously required simple majority.
Within two years,  the state’s  budget surplus had been spent,  mostly by bailing out
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hard-pressed city and county governments.5 Prop 13 also had more far-reaching and
unforeseen consequences.
8 By limiting property taxes, the state became more dependent on the sales and income
tax, and those taxes, especially the income tax, have shown significant variation based
on  the  economic  cycle.  California’s  income  tax  is  fairly  progressive.  Over  the  past
twenty years, the top 1% of taxpayers has paid between 33% and 49% of all state income
taxes.6 The income of the top 1% consists disproportionately of investment income and
capital  gains,  which  are  especially  susceptible  to  economic  downturns.  Increased
reliance on the income tax has therefore produced larger variations in state revenue,
following the economic cycle.
9 Another unforeseen consequence was that  the responsibility  for  funding the public
schools shifted away from local school districts, which had relied on the property tax,
to the state government, which receives most of its revenue from sales and income
taxes,  making school  funding more susceptible to variations in the economic cycle.
Prop  13  brought  a  significant  reduction  in  spending  on  public  education.  By  1986,
California  had  fallen  from 17th  to  35th  place  in  spending  per  pupil  for  the  public
primary and secondary schools (called K-12), and finished last among all the states in
the K-12 student/teacher ratio (a common measure of quality).7
10 Prop 13 generated a revolution in the use of the initiative by many groups. As funding
for  education  fell,  the  California  Teachers  Association  (the  largest  teachers’  union)
turned to the initiative to stabilize funding for schools and community colleges. Voters
approved  Proposition  98  in  1988,  requiring  that  the  public  primary  and  secondary
schools and community colleges (called K-14) receive the same percentage of the state
general  fund  as  in  1986-87.  If  state  revenues  go  up,  funding  for  K-14  must  go  up
proportionately.  If  state revenues fall,  any cuts in K-14 funding must be no greater
proportionately than cuts in overall state spending.8
11 Taken together,  Propositions 13 and 98 present a new version of direct democracy:
voters could choose not to tax themselves and could also mandate how to spend public
funds.  Voters  have  frequently  chosen  to  mandate  expenditures  without  mandating
corresponding taxes, e.g., voters in 1990 approved Proposition 117 which required the
state to spend at least $30 million a year on wildlife protection.9 Taken together with
federal mandates, this has meant that governors and legislators have found themselves
unable to increase most taxes and unable to cut most state expenditures. This situation
has been widely – and correctly – blamed for the annual gridlock over the state budget.
But there were other elements as well, including several that also derived from direct
democracy. (The most serious cases of legislative dysfunction have all had to do with
the budget and taxes; for policy decisions requiring a simple majority, the legislature
has  sometimes  accomplished  significant  initiatives,  notably  in  environmental
legislation.) 
12 The sharp increase in the use of direct democracy in the late 20th century led many
political  observers  to  refer  to  “government  by  initiative”  – that  is,  well  organized
interested groups that seek to bypass the legislature and secure favorable public policy
by hiring agents to solicit the necessary signatures to get a proposal on the ballot and
then  spending  lavishly  on  political  advertising  to  gain  a  majority  of  the  votes  on
election day.10
13 Although many corporations have jumped onto the initiative bandwagon, their most
transparent efforts to benefit themselves have failed. In 1988, voters were presented
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with five different initiatives on automobile insurance rates, three promoted by the
insurance industry and the other two opposed by the industry. Voters approved only
one, supported by consumer groups and opposed by the insurance industry.11 In 2000,
voters rejected a proposition, initiated by the owner of a large chain of tobacco stores,
to  reduce  the  tax  on  cigarettes.12 In  2010,  a  Texas  oil  refining  company  used  the
initiative to try to suspend California’s pioneering law to reduce global warming, only
to lose against a strong campaign by environmental groups.13 The record of these and
similar corporate attempts to mandate state policy through the ballot box suggests that
it is easier to defeat an initiative than to pass it.  Though corporations and business
organizations  have  often  failed  in  their  efforts  to  benefit  themselves  through
initiatives, they have typically been more successful in defeating initiatives that they
opposed or in supporting measures to keep taxes low or otherwise limit government.
For example, in spring 2012 election, a coalition of health organizations sponsored an
initiative to increase the tax on cigarettes to fund cancer research; polls showed that it
was passing until the tobacco industry spent $47 million on advertising to defeat it.14
14 An example of using direct democracy to reduce legislative effectiveness came in 1990,
when California voters approved Proposition 140, a constitutional amendment limiting
the number of terms for state officials.15 Voters adopted term limits partly in response
to the increasing entrenchment of incumbents. However, there were other currents in
the vote for term limits – it  was promoted largely by Republican conservatives and
business  groups  who  hoped  to  remove  popular,  long-serving  liberals  and  thereby,
perhaps,  open  more  opportunities  for  their  candidates.  Some  proponents  of  the
measure also saw it as a way to end the long tenure as speaker of the assembly of Willie
Brown, an African American Democrat from San Francisco who particularly infuriated
conservatives.16 Recent studies have concluded that, with term limits, legislators are no
sooner elected than they begin casting around for a new office to run for, limiting their
interest  in  learning  the  intricacies  of  the  position  they  have,  weakening  their
effectiveness as legislators, and increasing the influence of lobbyists and the relative
power of the governor.17
 
Direct Democracy and Partisan Mobilization
15 In the 1990s, conservatives and Republicans made effective use of the initiative both to
create  public  policies  that  the  legislature  refused  to  adopt  and  simultaneously  to
mobilize like-minded voters on election day. During much of the 1990s, California was
governed  by  a  dysfunctional  match-up  of  a  Republican  governor  and  Democratic
legislature. In 1990, Californians elected as governor, Peter Wilson, a former mayor of
San  Diego  who  had  won  election  to  two  terms  in  the  U.S.  Senate.  At  stake  was
redistricting – Republican strategists  persuaded Wilson to run for governor because
they  knew  that  they  could  not  win  control  of  the  legislature,  but  by winning  the
governorship  they  hoped  to  keep  the  Democratic  legislature  from  eliminating
Republican  seats  through  redistricting.18 Wilson  won  narrowly.  He  vetoed  the
legislature’s  redistricting plans and asked the state supreme court to establish new
districts,  but  the  result  produced  few  competitive  districts.19 One-party districts
combined with term limits meant that the real election was usually the primary, when
the majority party in the district chose its candidate. Primary voters tend to be the
party faithful, more partisan and more ideological than general election voters, and, it
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has  been  argued,  the  legislators  they  choose  tend  to  be  similarly  partisan  and
ideological.
16 In 1991, Wilson was faced with a sagging economy and a $14.3 billion projected deficit
in state funds. In response, he raised taxes and slashed spending.20 The following year, a
budget deadlock between Wilson and the state legislature dragged on for 64 days.21
Wilson moved steadily to the right during his years as governor. He reduced welfare
benefits,  cut  expenditures  on  workers’  compensation,  and  convinced  the  Industrial
Welfare Commission to remove restrictions on overtime.22
17 Wilson hoped to run for president in 1996. To do that, he had to win reelection by a
large  margin  in  1994.  That  meant  mobilizing  the  Republican  political  base.  Wilson
focused  his  reelection  campaign  on  illegal  immigration,  which  he  claimed  was
endangering the state due of  the cost of  educating and providing social  services to
illegal immigrants. 
18 When the Democratic majority in the legislature ignored Wilson’s campaign against
illegal  immigrants,  he  promoted  an  initiative,  Proposition  187,  to  deny  to
undocumented  immigrants  all  state-funded  services  including  education,  social
services,  and  non-emergency  health  care.  The  measure  required  teachers,  service
providers, and doctors to report suspected illegal aliens to authorities. Prop 187 passed
by a large margin. Almost two-thirds of white voters supported it, along with roughly
half of black and Asian American voters and nearly a quarter of Latino voters.23
19 Prop  187  illustrates  how  initiatives  can  be  used,  in  conjunction  with  an  electoral
campaign by a candidate, to mobilize particular groups of voters. In 1994, Wilson used
Prop 187 to mobilize California voters who were anxious about the increasing presence
of  immigrants,  especially  Spanish-speaking  immigrants.  The  success  of  Prop 187  in
getting votes from African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos also exemplifies a
“wedge issue.” Wilson used Prop 187 to drive a wedge into the Democrats’ voter base,
with the intent of splitting off some Democratic voters. In the short-run, he secured
reelection even though federal courts quickly invalidated most of the proposition. In
the long run, Wilson’s strategy backfired, as it led many Latino immigrants to become
voters – and to vote for the Democrats, who had opposed Prop 187. 
 
The Recall as Partisan Weapon
20 In April 1994, opponents of gun control tried to recall liberal Democrat David Roberti,
president pro tempore of the state senate and a strong supporter of gun control laws. It
was the first effort to recall a member of the legislature since 1914. Widely touted as a
test of the strength of anti-gun control forces, the recall failed.24
21 Use of the recall as a partisan tactic escalated the next year. The 1994 elections seemed
to give Republicans a one-vote majority in the state assembly. However, when it came
time to elect a speaker, one Republican, Paul Horcher, voted for Willie Brown, the long-
time Democratic  Speaker  of  the  Assembly,  creating a  40-40  tie.  Without  an elected
speaker, the rules called for the most senior member of the Assembly to preside – and
that was Willie Brown. Soon after, the assembly disqualified one Republican member
from  voting  because  he  had  been  elected  to  the  state  senate.  With  support  from
Horcher,  Brown  won  election  as  speaker.  Furious  Republicans  then  mounted  a
successful recall election against Horcher.25 Republican party leaders also threatened to
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run recall  elections against  Democrats,  but only one actually took place and it  was
defeated by a large margin.26 With Horcher out, Democratic assembly members voted
for Doris Allen, a Republican who was dissatisfied with the Republican leadership and
who, adding her own vote to that of the Democrats, became the first woman to serve as
speaker.  Republicans  then quickly  mobilized for  another special  recall  election and
recalled Allen.27 Thus, by the end of that year, Republicans had successfully used recall
elections  twice  to  enforce  party  discipline  and  unsuccessfully  once  to  punish  a
Democrat.
22 The most dramatic use of the recall was in the case of Governor Joseph “Gray” Davis in
2003. First elected in 1998, Davis was the first Democrat to win that office since 1978.28
As governor, Davis moved cautiously and was often at odds with the liberal Democrats
who led the legislature. Since Prop 13, the constitution had required that the budget be
approved by a two-thirds vote, and the Democrats always fell a few votes short. Capital
gains taxes during the dot-com boom generated a flood of state revenues, and in 2000
the Republican minority in the legislature insisted on tax cuts in return for their votes
to approve the budget. The legislature approved, and Davis signed, measures to reduce
taxes by $1.4 billion.29
23 Early  in  2001,  Davis  faced  a  statewide  energy  crisis  created  in  major  part  by
deregulation.  Demand  for  electricity  rose  sharply,  supply  fell  for  several  reasons
including  manipulation  of  the  market,  and  prices  skyrocketed.  By  2001,  utility
companies,  claiming  to  be  unable  to  buy  sufficient  energy,  instituted  “rolling
blackouts” that shut down power one grid section at a time. Liberal Democrats in the
legislature  urged  Davis  to  take  the  companies  over  if  necessary,  but  Davis  instead
committed $43 billion to long-term contracts with wholesalers, producing a quick drop
in  his  popularity.30 In  2002,  Davis  narrowly  won  a  second  term  at  a  time  when
Democrats  easily  won  nearly  all  other  statewide  races.  Davis’s  campaign  was  so
negative that many voters stayed at home, producing the lowest proportional turnout
in the state's history – and, ironically, significantly reducing the number of signatures
needed to trigger a special recall election.31
24 In 2003, California faced a monstrous budget deficit – between $26 and $35 billion –
resulting from reduced tax revenues caused by recession, the tax cuts in 2000, the $43-
billion electricity contracts, and inflation. With most seasoned legislators turned out
due to term limits, only a few legislators had experience with such a situation. There
seemed no way to  resolve  the  budget  problems short  of  a  tax  increase  or  massive
spending cuts. Republicans refused to support any tax increase, and some Republicans
threatened  that  any  Republican  who  voted  for  a  tax  increase  would  be  recalled.
Democrats lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to increase taxes, but refused to
slash  spending  for  education  and  healthcare.  A  long  deadlock  was  finally  resolved
through borrowing – thus putting off the problem.32
25 Public  opinion  polls  registered  a  level  of  voter  discontent  that  surpassed  anything
previously measured. Seven voters in ten disapproved of both Davis and the legislature.
33 Voters seemed to be angry with the political system itself, and Davis, as governor,
was the most visible target for that anger. 
26 Shortly after Davis began his second term, Ted Costa launched a campaign to recall
Davis. Costa had entered politics as an assistant to Paul Gann, who, with Howard Jarvis,
had initiated Proposition 13.34 The effort sputtered along until late April when Darrell
Issa, a conservative Republican member of Congress, pumped $1.6 million of his own
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funds into the recall. The recall then took off as paid organizers effectively tapped into
voters' anger, especially through talk radio and the internet. In the end, there were
twice as many signatures as needed to trigger a special recall election.35
27 Californians voted on two matters – whether Davis should be recalled and who should
succeed him. Davis was barred from running. The election brought an outpouring of
candidates –135 in total – and a media circus that captured national and international
headlines. In this circus, the star proved to be the weightlifter. To the surprise of Issa,
who  had  planned  to  run,  Arnold  Schwarzenegger  announced  his  candidacy.  Other
Republicans, including a tearful Issa, bowed out under pressure from party leaders. In
his  campaign,  Schwarzenegger  skillfully  tapped  into  the  widespread  anger  among
voters. “We, the people,” Schwarzenegger said in one of his most effective campaign
ads, “are doing our job, working hard, raising our families and paying taxes. But the
politicians are not doing their job.”36 The vote to recall Davis received 55 percent in
favor. In the vote for governor, Schwarzenegger received 49 percent.37
 
Governing by Initiative: The Governorships of Arnold
Schwarzenegger and Jerry Brown
28 Schwarzenegger  faced  one  of  the  biggest  challenges  to  confront  any  California
governor.  Many knowledgeable Californians considered that if  the state had been a
corporation or a city it would have had to declare bankruptcy. Schwarzenegger first
persuaded the legislature to repeal an unpopular motor vehicle tax, further increasing
the deficit. He then sought a popular vote on a huge bond issue – $15 billion – to borrow
more funds to resolve the state's desperate financial situation, and he tied the bond
issue  to  a  constitutional  amendment  for  a  state  reserve  fund.  He  campaigned
aggressively for both measures, and both won by large margins.38 Balancing the state
budget by borrowing, however, was clearly a temporary expedient. 
29 In  January  2005,  Schwarzenegger  announced  a  “year  of  reform,”  and  presented
proposals  to  tackle  transportation  problems,  change  public  employee  pension
programs,  and scrap many state  agencies.39 When those  failed  to  attract  legislative
support,  he  focused  instead  on  four  initiative  propositions:  to  make  tenure  more
difficult for public school teachers, restrict political contributions by public employee
unions,  limit  state  spending,  and take  redistricting  away from the  legislature.  This
“reform agenda” was quickly endorsed by business leaders, the Republican Party, many
chambers  of  commerce,  and  the  California  Bankers  Association.  Strong  opposition
came  from  unions  of  teachers,  nurses,  firefighters,  and  police,  along  with  the
Democratic party. In the end, voters seemed to identify more with teachers, nurses, and
firefighters than with bankers and chambers of commerce. All four propositions were
defeated.40
30 Schwarzenegger responded not with anger but contrition. He acknowledged that he
had  been  mistaken  to  target  public  employees,  promised  more  cooperation  with
Democrats,  but  also  promised  to  continue  his  efforts  to  put  the  state  on  a  sound
financial footing.41 In a personal victory, he won reelection in 2006 at the same time
voters elected Democrats to all  but one of the other statewide offices and returned
Democratic majorities in the legislature.  Voters also approved large bond issues for
transportation and public educational infrastructure.42
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31 The struggle over the budget in 2008 was one of the longest in the state’s history. At
one point Schwarzenegger agreed with the Democratic legislative leadership that both
new taxes and spending cuts were required, but he failed to sway even one Republican
in the legislature, and once again there were threats of recall against any Republican
who might vote to increase taxes. Eighty-five days late, the legislature finally approved
a  budget  but  did  so  by  passing  crucial  decisions  to  the  voters,  in  the  form  of  six
propositions to be voted on in May 2009. The first five proposed to create a financial
reserve, use it to restore educational funding, establish a cap on state expenditures,
give  the  governor  new  power  to  cut  spending,  and  redirect  funds  from  existing
programs created by initiatives. All were defeated by 2-1 margins. The only one that
passed – and it passed by a 3-1 margin – requires that elected officials not receive pay
increases when the state has a deficit.43 In response to the defeat of those propositions,
the governor’s finance office announced budget cuts totalling nearly $15 billion.44 In
2009, the budget was again passed mostly by smoke and mirrors and by unpaid leaves
for state employees. In the end, Schwarzenegger failed to resolve the state’s financial
problems as he promised when he was elected, and he ended up with popularity ratings
as low as those of Gray Davis.
32 In the elections of 2010, California bucked the tide of Republican victories across the
country. Democrats swept all  statewide elections and held all  their legislative seats.
Former governor Jerry Brown won the governorship.45 As governor,  Brown reached
into the past and tried to craft a bi-partisan approach to the state’s budget crisis. He
tried to persuade the legislature to permit voters to decide on raising taxes, but the
Republicans  refused.  Again  there  were  threats  to  recall  any  Republican  who broke
ranks. Passing the budget was easier because an initiative in 2010 changed the long-
standing two-thirds rule to a simple majority, though the two-thirds rule persisted for
tax increases. The final budget closed some state parks (others became dependent on
private  funding),  eliminated  some  social  services,  transferred  significant  costs  to
university students in the form of large tuition increases, and transferred other costs to
local governments. At the same time, Brown proposed an initiative for the November
2012 ballot to raise taxes on the wealthiest Californians, modestly increase the sales
tax,  and earmark the new funds for  education.  Several  other groups also proposed
initiatives to raise taxes in 2012, and a last-minute compromise led to the merger of
Brown’s proposal with one promoted by a teachers’ union. Early polling suggests that
voters may approve a tax increase on the wealthy – which, if passed, will make state
revenue  even  more  susceptible  to  economic  downturns.46 Thus,  in  the  end,  both
Swarzenegger and Brown followed Wilson’s lead and resorted to initiatives when their
proposals were blocked in the legislature.
 
Using Direct Democracy to Change the Political
Ground Rules
33 The 2012 elections involve major changes in the political ground rules, changes claimed
by  their  advocates  as  ways  to  challenge  the  intense  partisanship  that  has  long
characterized the legislature. Redistricting in 1981, 1991, and 2001 created districts that
nearly all had a reliable majority for one party, so the real election was typically the
primary.  One  consequence  seems  to  have  been  that  legislators  from  both  parties
became more partisan, because candidates needed to appeal only to their party’s base
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and  not  to  moderates  or  independents.  (This  is  not  unique  to  California.  Similar
redistricting takes place in most states. Across the country, the past few decades have
seen  a  growth  in  hyperpartisanship,  and  frequently  a  reduction  in  civility. Non-
competitive districts have been only one contributing factor to this development.) 
34 In  the  2001  redistricting,  the  leading  Democrats  in  the  legislature  – John  Burton,
president pro tempore of the Senate, and Robert Hertzberg, speaker of the Assembly –
had the prospect of creating somewhat more competitive districts that would be likely
in most elections to give the Democrats the two-thirds majority that they needed to
pass budgets and taxes without the Republicans. However, given the virtual certainty
that Republicans would have challenged such a redistricting plan, either in the courts
or through a referendum, the Democrats instead drafted a redistricting map that gave
every incumbent a safe district, thereby giving Republicans slightly more seats than
they might otherwise have won in return for Republican promises not to challenge the
redistricting  act  with  referenda  or  court  cases.47 Never  able  to  win  a  legislative
majority, California Republicans nonetheless maintained a veto over the budget (until
2010) and over tax increases due to the two-thirds requirements. As a consequence of
the 2001 redistricting, not only was every legislative seat safely Republican or safely
Democratic, but Republicans were also guaranteed to have enough votes to block any
budget or tax increase. The results, not surprisingly, were a decade of deadlock on the
annual budget. Democrat legislators always had to win over at least a few Republicans
to pass a budget.
35 In 2008 and 2010, California voters approved propositions intended to change some of
those  partisan  dynamics.  As  already  noted,  one  was  an  initiative  constitutional
amendment promoted by public-employee unions to permit a simple majority of the
legislature  to  approve  the  budget,  although  two-thirds  are  still  required  for  tax
increases.48 The other changes directly affect the 2012 elections. 
36 One  of  the  new  procedures,  a  constitutional  amendment,  significantly  changes  the
direct  primary.  Previously,  only  registered  party  members  could  participate  in  the
primary to select their party’s candidates.  Now, for all  offices except president and
members of political parties’ county central committees, all candidates of all parties are
on  the  same  primary  ballot,  all  voters  regardless  of  party  choose  among  all  the
candidates, and the two candidates with the highest vote face each other in the general
election.  Write-in  candidates  are  not  permitted  in  the  general  election.  Those  who
supported  this  change  argued  that  it  will  encourage  candidates  to  appeal  to
independents  and  moderate  voters  of  both  major  parties,  rather  than  to  the  most
partisan voters. They also argued that this procedure will produce a more moderate
legislature, based on the assumption that legislators elected by centrist voters will have
weaker party commitments and be more likely to cooperate with members of the other
party.49
37 The Top-Two Primaries Law was put on the ballot not as the result of a voter initiative
but as the result of a deal within the state legislature. Abel Maldonado, a moderate
Republican  in  the  state  senate  who  has  been  called  a  “pragmatic  centrist”  and  an
“adept horse-trader,” agreed to provide the necessary vote to pass the 2009 budget in
return for a promise from Democratic legislative leaders that they would put the Top-
Two Primaries amendment on the ballot in 2010. The proposition was supported by
Governor  Schwarzenegger,  the  state  chamber  of  commerce,  several  business
associations and corporations, and a few Democrats. Opponents included all registered
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political parties, which held a joint press conference to announce their opposition.50
The  other  new election procedure,  also  a  constitutional  amendment,  resulted  from
initiatives in 2008 and 2010 sponsored by an unusual coalition that included the League
of Women Voters, the Southern California ACLU, the state NAACP, the LA Chamber of
Commerce,  Arnold  Schwarzenegger,  and  Gray  Davis.  The  two  initiatives  remove
redistricting from the legislature and give it to a fourteen-member citizens commission
chosen  through  a  complex  process  designed  to  keep  out  current  officials;  provide
regional,  ethnic,  and  gender  diversity;  and  maintain  a  political  balance  among
Democrats,  Republicans,  and  nonpartisans.  The  commission  is  charged  to  create
districts based on communities of interest and to ignore partisan registrations.51 Its
supporters argued that this would create more competitive districts where candidates
would have to  appeal  to  independent  and moderate  voters.  Again,  the  goal  was  to
create a less partisan legislature and to make members of the legislature pay more
attention to voters other than those in their party’s base. 
38 The new districts took effect for the 2012 primary elections, and there have been some
major changes. The new districts are likely to give Democrats a two-thirds majority in
the state senate, so Republicans have launched both a referendum and a court case to
block the new districts from being implemented. They failed, however, to prevent them
from  being  used  in  the  2012  primary  elections.  The  new  districts  do  not  protect
incumbents in the way that incumbents were protected when the legislature did the
redistricting. Seven members of Congress chose not seek reelection, including some
whose  districts  were  substantially  redrawn.  But  the  new system has  also  produced
anomalous results. In the 2012 general election, there are several districts where both
candidates  are  Democrats  and  a  few  where  both  candidates  are  Republicans.  Two
powerful congressional Democrats have been thrown into the same district and are
fighting it out under the new primary rules. One very senior Democrat faces a serious
challenge from another Democrat. Several of the new districts have no incumbent. In
one district with a Democratic majority among the voters, the two candidates will both
be Republicans, because a large number of Democrat candidates split their partisans’
votes in the primary.52
39 Taken  together,  these  two  new  election  laws  represent  interesting  experiments  in
reducing intense legislative partisanship. Only the outcome of the 2012 elections and
the behavior of state legislators in the 2013 legislative session and after will indicate if
the experiment proves successful. However, the basic assumption behind both changes
is that legislative dysfunction results primarily from hyperpartisanship, and neither
change addresses the many constraints on the legislature created by direct democracy.
The legislature will still be tightly constrained by the various initiatives that mandate
expenditures,  restrict  taxation,  or  otherwise  remove  policy  decisions  from  the
legislative arena.
 
What’s To Be Done?
40 While these election procedures may produce a more moderate legislature, they seem
unlikely by themselves to alter the dispiriting chronicle of legislative dysfunction just
presented. Is it possible to restore the legislature’s ability to legislate without doing
away with direct democracy? Here are my suggestions, some of which appear in direct
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democracy procedures in other states or in various proposals that have appeared in
California in recent years:
41 - Increase the number of signatures required for a recall to that of most other states
with recall procedures;
- Require that any initiative mandating spending must include a new tax to fund the
spending and that any initiative restricting state revenues must specify the programs
to be reduced or eliminated because of the restriction of revenues;
-  Permit  the  legislature  to  amend  initiatives  after  a  year  or  two,  subject  to  the
referendum;
- Require that any proposition mandating an extraordinary majority for governmental
action must be passed by the same majority;
- Repeal the two-thirds majority requirement for increasing taxes;
- Limit campaign contributions to registered voters in California;
- Return to party primaries;
- Eliminate term limits.
42 These changes would at least begin to restore the legislature’s ability to legislate. And,
if voters could reasonably expect parties to deliver on their campaign promises and
would  not  re-elect  those  who  fail  to  do  so,  these  changes  might  promote  more
responsible parties.
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ABSTRACTS
Critics have condemned California’s legislature as seriously dysfunctional and have blamed direct
democracy,  especially  the  initiative.  This  paper  examines  the  use  of  direct  democracy  in
California since 1978, focusing on the use of direct democracy by political conservatives to limit
revenue  and  otherwise  restrict  state  government,  and  on  the  use  of  the  initiative  by  other
interest groups to protect state-funded programs. These actions have constrained the ability of
the legislature to govern and have shifted power from elected legislators to organized interest
groups and the governor.
Le  législateur  californien  a  été  vivement  critiqué  pour  ses  dysfonctionnements  graves  et  la
démocratie  directe –  plus  particulièrement  l’initiative  populaire –  a  été  largement  dénoncée.
Cette contribution examine le recours à la démocratie directe en Californie, depuis 1978. Elle se
penche plus spécifiquement sur l’utilisation faite de la démocratie directe par les conservateurs
afin de limiter les recettes et par là même paralyser le gouvernement et l’utilisation de l’initiative
par  les  autres  groupes  d’intérêt  pour  protéger  les  programmes  financés  par  l’Etat.  De  tels
comportements ont entravé la capacité d’action du législateur et ont fait basculer le pouvoir des
mains des représentants élus à celles de groupes d’intérêt organisés et du Gouverneur.
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